GAR 2015 Main Report

127

between 1990 and 2002 found that high rates of corruption-related crimes in Mississippi, Florida and South Dakota were correlated to large numbers of disaster events and related losses in the same three states and throughout America (Leeson and Sobel, 2008

Leeson, Peter T. and Russell S. Sobel. 2008,Blame the Weather? Natural Disasters, FEMA, and Corruption in America, Article containing material from: Peter T. Leeson and Russell S. Sobel, 2008. Weathering Corruption, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 4: 667-681.. .

). There was some causality to this correlation in that opportunity for corruption in those states was bred by the inflow of large sums of relief funding and lucrative postdisaster construction contracts (ibid.).

In contrast, the different ways in which corrupt practices shape patterns of vulnerability and exposure and determine levels of risk are not as well understood. In sectors and localities, corrupt practices can increase disaster risk by corroding a culture of compliance that is key to the effectiveness of codes, standards and similar regulatory mechanisms. The construction industry is one of the sectors most critical to disaster risk management and also one of the most prone to corruption (Transparency International, 2005

Transparency International. 2005,Global Corruption Report 2005: Special focus - Corruption in Construction and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. London: Pluto Press.. .

). An estimated US$4 trillion per year is spent on government procurement for construction worldwide, and a

significant part of this expenditure is lost to corruption, accounting for an estimated 10-30 per cent of every project鈥檚 value (ibid.).

Corruptpracticesinhazard-proneareascontribute directly to increasing the vulnerability and exposure of assets and people (Lewis, 2011

Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, J脿mb谩: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. .

). For example, following the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, the depletion of funds for school buildings reportedly led to compromised design standards and regulatory codes (Pei, 2007

Pei, Minxin. 2007,Corruption Threatens China鈥檚 Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Policy Brief 55. October 2007.. .

; Lewis, 2011

). While many older buildings survived the earthquake relatively unscathed, over 7,000 more recently built classrooms collapsed, resulting in high mortality; one local school reported the death of 900 children in the earthquake (Lewis, 2011

Given that disaster risk is configured by hazard and exposure as well as vulnerability, there is no direct correlation between disaster risk and levels of corruption (Figure 6.4). For example, Japan and Eritrea or Grenada and Haiti are pairs of countries with similar relative levels of disaster risk (AAL as a proportion of exposed assets).

(Source: UNISDR based on data from Global Risk Assessment and the World Bank.)

Figure 6.4 Control of corruption and disaster risk

	127 between 1990 and 2002 found that high rates of corruption-related crimes in Mississippi, Florida and South Dakota were correlated to large numbers of disaster events and related losses in the same three states and throughout America (Leeson and Sobel, 2008 x Leeson, Peter T. and Russell S. Sobel. 2008,Blame the Weather? Natural Disasters, FEMA, and Corruption in America, Article containing material from: Peter T. Leeson and Russell S. Sobel, 2008. Weathering Corruption, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 51, No. 4: 667-681.. . ). There was some causality to this correlation in that opportunity for corruption in those states was bred by the inflow of large sums of relief funding and lucrative postdisaster construction contracts (ibid.). In contrast, the different ways in which corrupt practices shape patterns of vulnerability and exposure and determine levels of risk are not as well understood. In sectors and localities, corrupt practices can increase disaster risk by corroding a culture of compliance that is key to the effectiveness of codes, standards and similar regulatory mechanisms. The construction industry is one of the sectors most critical to disaster risk management and also one of the most prone to corruption (Transparency International, 2005 x Transparency International. 2005,Global Corruption Report 2005: Special focus - Corruption in Construction and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Foreword by Francis Fukuyama. London: Pluto Press.. . ). An estimated US$4 trillion per year is spent on government procurement for construction worldwide, and a significant part of this expenditure is lost to corruption, accounting for an estimated 10-30 per cent of every project鈥檚 value (ibid.). Corruptpracticesinhazard-proneareascontribute directly to increasing the vulnerability and exposure of assets and people (Lewis, 2011 x Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, J脿mb谩: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. . ). For example, following the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008, the depletion of funds for school buildings reportedly led to compromised design standards and regulatory codes (Pei, 2007 x Pei, Minxin. 2007,Corruption Threatens China鈥檚 Future, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Policy Brief 55. October 2007.. . ; Lewis, 2011 x Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, J脿mb谩: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. . ). While many older buildings survived the earthquake relatively unscathed, over 7,000 more recently built classrooms collapsed, resulting in high mortality; one local school reported the death of 900 children in the earthquake (Lewis, 2011 x Lewis, James. 2011,Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters, J脿mb谩: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, May 2011.. . ). Given that disaster risk is configured by hazard and exposure as well as vulnerability, there is no direct correlation between disaster risk and levels of corruption (Figure 6.4). For example, Japan and Eritrea or Grenada and Haiti are pairs of countries with similar relative levels of disaster risk (AAL as a proportion of exposed assets). (Source: UNISDR based on data from Global Risk Assessment and the World Bank.) Figure 6.4 Control of corruption and disaster risk	Page 1 Page 10 Page 20 Page 30 Page 40 Page 50 Page 60 Page 70 Page 80 Page 90 Page 100 Page 110 Page 117 Page 118 Page 119 Page 120 Page 121 Page 122 Page 123 Page 124 Page 125 Page 126 Page 127 Page 128 ->Page 129 Page 130 Page 131 Page 132 Page 133 Page 134 Page 135 Page 136 Page 137 Page 138 Page 139 Page 140 Page 141 Page 150 Page 160 Page 170 Page 180 Page 190 Page 200 Page 210 Page 220 Page 230 Page 240 Page 250 Page 260 Page 270 Page 280 Page 290 Page 300 Page 310

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